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CHAPTER 6 
Domestic Relations 
MONROE L. INKER* 
A. CouRT DEciSIONS 
§6.1. Divorce: Counsel Fees: Equal Protection. In House v. 
House/ the Supreme Judicial Court confronted the issue whether a 
trial court properly refused to allow counsel fees to the wife in con-
nection with the maintenance of a divorce libel. The trial court held 
that Rule 47 of the Rules of the Probate Courts (1959)2-the rule 
upon which the wife's application for an allowance was 
based-violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment of the United States Constitution, since it provided for 
counsel fees to a wife, but not to a husband.3 
In holding that the lower court was not constitutionally prohibited 
from allowing counsel fees to the wife, the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated that Rule 4 7 neither granted to the wife, nor denied to the 
husband, the right to seek an allowance of counsel fees. That Rule 
merely set forth the requirements that a wife must meet in order to 
apply for such an allowance. 4 The absence of a similar Rule with re-
spect to a husband had no affect upon his substantive right to simi-
larly be awarded such fees. Those rights are conferred upon a hus-
band by virtue of section 38 of chapter 208 of the General Laws and 
are in no way restricted by Rule 4 7. 5 
Section 38 provides: 
*MONROE L. INKER is a partner in the law firm of Crane & Inker, Boston, and is an 
Instructor in Law at Boston College Law School. 
§ 6.1. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1964, 330 N.E.2d 152. 
2 Rule 47 of the Rules of the Probate Courts (1959) has been deleted from the new 
Probate Rules, which became effective July 1, 1975. The Rule read as follows: 
An application by a wife for an allowance to enable her to defend or prosecute a 
libel shall contain a statement that she intends in good faith to defend or prosecute 
such libel, and shall be accompanied by a certificate of her attorney that he be-
lieves such statement to be true. If such allowance is granted, it shall be paid as the 
Court may direct. 
3 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1964-66, 330 N.E.2d at 153. 
4 /d. at 1965, 330 N.E.2d at 153. 
5 /d. at 1967, 330 N.E.2d at 153. 
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In any proceeding under this chapter ... the court may, in its 
discretion, award costs and expenses, or either, to either party .... 
In any case wherein costs and expenses, or either, may be 
awarded hereunder to a party, they may be awarded to his or her 
counsel, or may be apportioned between them. 6 ! 
Thus, since the probate court had equal · cl-uth6rity ~o allow counsel 
fees to wives and husbands, there would be no denial of the equal 
protection of the laws where such an allowance was made to a wife. 7 
In resolving the issue by reference to the statutory authority to grant 
the allowance of counsel fees, the Court expressly avoilded considering 
whether Rule 47 discriminated unconstitutionally in f4vor of women. 8 
In dicta, the Court suggest~d that Rule 4 7 did not violate the equal 
protection clause since it was merely a procedural inechanisin for deal~ 
ing with the more common economic situation-a wife who needs 
funds to maintain a divorce action-.and was not.an'a~empt to restrict 
the statutory right of husbands under section 38 to ceive an allow-
ance to maintain a divorce action in appropriate circu stances. 9 · 
Since the decision in House· v. House, Rule 406 of the riew Rules of 
the Probate Courts has replaced Rule 47. Aside from substituting 
the word "party" for "wife" (along with the necess1ary pronominal 
changes), the new rule is the same as the old one. 10 ' Thus, a proce-
dure whereby either the husband or the wife can ap~ly f6r an allow-
ance to defend or prosecute a divorce action has been established~ 
This change will preclude future challenges to the Rule on equal pto-
tection grounds. 
§6.2. Divorce: Jurisdiction to Award Child Sup~rt. In Wyman 
v. Wyman, 1 the husband was', pursuant to a decree ni i, awarded cus-
t?dy of. the only child of the rparr~a~e. Thereafte~, h . filed. two peti-
tiOns With the probate court seekmg an order d1rectmg hts former 
wife to contribute to the child's support. 2 The first petition, brought 
' . 
6 G.L. c. 208, § 38 (emphasis added). 
7 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1967, 330 N.E.2d at 153. 
8 /d. at 1967, 330 N.E.2d at 154. For cases expressly confronting this issue, see (a) 
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (cases invalidating sex-based discrimination); and (b) 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (cases 
upholding statutory distinctions based on sex). 
9 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1967, 330 N.E.2d at 153. i 
10 Rule 406 also substitutes the word "complaint" for "libel." Th~ Rule· reads as fol-
lows: 
An application by a party for an allowance to enable him to defend or prosecute 
a complaint shall contain a statement that he intends in good faith to -defend or 
prosecute such complaint, and shall be accompanied by a certificate of his attorney 
that he believes such statement to be true. If such allowance is granted,· it shall be 
paid as the court may direct. I 
§ 6.2. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 884, 330 N.E.2d 500. 
2 /d. at 884, 330 N.E.2d at 501. 
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pursuant to sections 34 and 34A of chapter 208 of the General Laws, 
prayed for a modification of the child support order. The second peti-
tion, which made no mention of child support, prayed for a modifi-
cation in accordance with section 34A. 3 The probate court directed 
that the wife's interest in certain real estate be conveyed to the hus-
band under section 34.4 
The Appeals Court, in reversing the probate court decree, ex-
amined the jurisdictional basis5 for the probate court's power to order 
the payment of child support. The court held that the probate court's 
authority to order the payment of money for the care and mainte-
nance of minor children is principally derived from section 28 of 
chapter 208.6 The husband's petition and the resulting order of the 
probate court were, however, based on section 34,7 which has been 
construed to authorize child support only to the extent that such an 
award is made incidental to an award of alimony. 8 Since the husband 
had not prayed for any allowance for himself in the nature of 
alimony, the order directing the conveyance, was by definition, not in-
cidental to alimony. The Appeals Court held that since the relief 
3 !d. at 884-85, 300 N .E.2d at 501. 
4 !d. at 885, 330 N.E.2d at 501-02. 
5 Id. at 886, 330 N.E.2d at 502. The petitioner husband's prayers for relief were 
jurisdictionally infirm in that: (1) the appropriate vehicle for the order of child support 
sought by the husband was G.L. c. 208 § 28, see note 5 infra and text at notes 5-8; (2) 
even assuming that he was seeking provision for his own support, a prayer for modifi-
cation was inappropriate-a new decree was required because there was no provision 
for an award of alimony in the original decree, 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 885 
n.2, 330 N.E.2d at 501-02 n.2, citing Baird v. Baird, 311 Mass. 329, 331-32, 333-34, 41 
N.E.2d 5, 6-7 (1942) (§ 37-regarding modification of alimony and child 
support-applies only after a decree of alimony has been entered rursuant to § 34) and 
Kinosian v. Kinosian, 351 Mass. 49, 52, 217 N.E.2d 769, 770-7 (1966) (§ 34 is the 
jurisdictional basis for the original alimony decree); and (3) even if an award in the na-
ture of alimony had been granted to the husband in the original decree, § 37-not § 34 
under which the husband had proceeded-would have been the proper jurisdictional 
basis for modification of the decree. 
6 G.L. c. 208, § 28 provides in part: 
Upon decree of divorce, or petition of either parent ... , after notice to both par-
ents, after such decree, the court may make such decree as it considers expedient 
relative to the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children of the parties, 
... and afterward may from time to time, upon the petition of either parent ... 
revise and alter such decree or make a new decree, as the circumstances of the 
parents and the benefit of the children may require. 
7 G.L. c. 208, § 34, as in effect at the time of the decree, provided: "Upon a divorce, 
or upon petition at any time after a divorce, the court may decree alimony to the wife, 
or a part of her estate, in the nature of alimony, to the husband." Section 34 has subse-
quently been amended by chapter 565 of the Acts of 197 4 and currently provides for 
an alimony award, or assignment of property, or both to either spouse based on the 
considerations set out in the new statutory provision. 
8 Topor v. Topor, 287 Mass. 473, 475, 192 N.E. 52, 53 (1934) (alimony may include 
provision for support and maintenance of minor children); Topalis v. Topalis, 1974 
Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 863, 865, 3l6 N.E.2d 765, 767 (same). 
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sought by the petition was intended only for the ben~fit of the minor 
child, the petition for child support should have been brought pur-
suant to section 28.9 
The Wyman decision is unnecessarily technical in its 1 approach to the 
question of the probate court's jurisdiction to order the payments of 
child support. Although the jurisdiction of the proba~e court to enter 
such an award is obviously essential to its validity, the court admitted 
that the probate court had jurisdiction in this case to make the order, 
albeit under section 28 instead of section 34. Thus, although the court 
was correct in deciding that child support could not ~ ordered apart 
from alimony under section 34, it should have treate¢1 the petition as 
one under section 28, thereby reaching the merits of t~e petition. 
§6.3. Divorce: Merger of Separation Agreements. In Gunter v. 
Gunter, 1 the Appeals Court held that the probate court was without 
jurisdiction to modify a separation agreement that was not merged 
into the decree of divorce.2 In holding that the ag¥ement was not 
merged into the divorce decree, the court stated: "A(lthough the de-
cree . . . referred to the agreement and purported toi incorporate the 
same by reference ... we think it did so only by way of explaining 
why no order was being entered for the support of the wife and 
minor child."3 Gunter's significance is that language 1 that has always 
been held sufficient to incorporate agreements into d~crees was found 
insufficient, thereby upsetting the expectations of th~ parties in a di-
vorce proceeding wherein the plain intention was to· incorporate the 
agreement. 
The language of the Gunter decree that "purported" to incorporate 
the agreement was: "[S]aid libellant have the care !and custody of 
Michael C. Gunter, their minor child and all other p~ovisons are pro-
vided for in an Agreement tktted March 13, 197 3 on file ivhich is made part 
of this decree by reference thereto. "4 It is clear that the intention of the 
9 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 887, 330 N.E.2d at 502. 
§ 6.3. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 463, 325 N.E.2d 297, appeal denied, 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1281. 
2 /d. at 463, 325 N.E.2d at 298. Unless a separation agreement is merged in the de-
cree of divorce, it retains its independent legal significance as a contractual obligation. 
Hills v. Shearer, 355 Mass. 405, 408-09, 245 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1969); Freeman v. Sieve, 
323 Mass. 652, 656, 84 N.E.2d 16, 19 (1949). The court "(has no] jurisdiction to 'mod-
ify' the contract by substituting for it new terms to which the: parties have never 
agreed." Schillander v. Schillander, 307 Mass. 96, 98-99, 29 N.E.2q 686, 687 (1940). If 
the agreement had been incorporated into the decree and made a part thereof, it 
would have become the decree of the court. See, e.g., Fabrizio v. Fabrizio, 316 Mass. 
343, 346-47, 55 N.E.2d 604, 605-06 (1944). 
3 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 463, 325 N.E.2d at 298. j 
4 (Emphasis added). This is the language used in the probate cqurt's decree. It was 
not cited m the Appeals Court's decision. ! 
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trial judge was to incorporate the agreement. 5 Nevertheless, the Ap-
peals Court held that the language used was inadequate because the 
decree "did not expressly order the husband to comply with the sup-
port provisions of the agreement."6 
If expectations are to be protected in the future, the parties should 
specifically request in the agreement that its provisions be incorpo-
rated into the decree, and the court in its decree should ratify, ap-
prove, and incorporate the provisions of the agreement and expressly 
order the parties to comply therewith. Although following these sug-
gestions should prevent misunderstandings with respect to the 
adequacy of future language used to incorporate separation agree-
ments, the adequacy of language in decrees already entered will have 
to be resolved by the costly process of appeal on a case by case basis 
until Gunter is either reversed or further explained by the appellate 
courts. 
§6.4. Divorce: Contempt: Payment of Support by Collateral 
Sources. In Cohen v. Murphy, 1 the probate court had ordered the 
appellant, pursuant to a divorce decree, to pay $50 per week for the 
support of his minor children. 2 After the decree was entered, the 
husband was awarded disability benefits by the Veterans' Administra-
tion and the Social Security Administration, which included benefits 
for the minor children.3 Some of these payments were received di-
rectly by the children, others were received by the husband and paid 
over to his ex-wife. In a later contempt proceeding against the appel-
lant brought by the wife alleging nonpayment of the $50 weekly pay-
ments, the probate judge found: ( 1) that the decree had ordered the 
husband to pay child support in the amount of $50 per week; (2) that 
the decree neither ordered nor authorized the satisfaction of that ob-
ligation by payments that might be made to the minor children by the 
Veterans' Administration or by the Social Security Administration; and 
(3) that the parties made no agreement that any such payments would 
satisfy the support order. Therefore, the judge ruled, as a matter of 
law, that the order for support was not satisfied by payment of these 
government dependency benefits, whether made directly to the wife 
or children, or made to the husband and subsequently paid over by 
him to the children. The support order could be satisfied only if the 
5 If the judge had not intended to incorporate the agreement, it is difficult to under-
stand why he identified the agreement with some particularity and then provided that it 
was made "part of this decree by reference thereto." (Emphasis added). If it had been 
his intention not to incorporate the agreement, that phrase would not have been in-
cluded. 
6 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 463, 325 N.E.2d at 298. 
§ 6.4. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2002, 330 N.E.2d 473. 
2 !d. at 2002, 330 N.E.2d at 474. 
3 !d. 
5
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husband himself paid the $50 per week as ordered by the court. The 
court therefore found the husband in contempt for his nonpayment 
of child support. 4 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the contenjlpt decree and 
held that, in the absence of a contrary provision in thq support order, 
Veterans' and Social Security benefits either paid dir1ctly to the wife 
or children, or given to the husband and subsequen ly paid over by 
him to his wife or children, are to be credited again t amounts due 
under a decree for the support of minor children.5 frhe Court first 
noted that in a contempt proceeding, ambiguities in a decree should 
be resolved in favor of the alleged contemnor.6 It then reasoned that 
the payments to the dependent children in this case "were earned in 
part by the [husband] himself and [were] not altogether a gift from 
the Federal Government." 7 The Court therefore reversed the con-
tempt decree and remanded the case to the probate c~urt for further 
proceedings to determine the amount of these govetnment depend-
ency benefits, which were to be credited against ! the arrearages 
under the original support order.8 , 
The Murphy decision is significant in that it permitted a party who 
had not complied with a support order to avoid ~he sanction of 
contempt9 by satisfying the support order, at least in part, with pay-
ments from a collateral source. To this extent, the case represents a 
noteworthy departure from the general rule that one who is ordered 
by a court to pay support is personally bound to fulfill the obligation 
and is suqject to a contempt sanction in the event of noncompliance. 10 
The breadth of the impact of the Murphy holding is not clear. On 
one hand, although the Murphy case deals specifically ~ith the issue of 
child support, 11 there appears to be nothing that would preclude its 
application to either an award of alimony or separa~e support to a 
spouse. The policies relative to the need for the effecttve enforcement 
4 /d. at 2004-05, 330 N.E.2d at 474. 
5 Id. at 2002-03, 330 N.E.2d 475. 
6 !d. at 2006, 330 N.E.2d at 475. 
7 Id. at 2008, 330 N.E.2d at 475. 
8 Id. at 2009, 330 N.E.2d at 476. 
I 
9 The Murphy case is limited by both its facts and its rationale to cases where the pro-
bate court seeks to enforce its order by contempt rather than by jtldgment and execu-
tion. The Court stated that "in a contempt proceeding for violation \>f a divorce decree, 
ambiguities in the decree should ordinarily be resolved in favor of ithe alleged contem-
nor," id. at 2006, 330 N.E.2d at 475 (emphasis added), indicating jthat the focus of its 
concern was that the defendant was to be subject to contempt for viplation of the order, 
rather than to some less extreme sanction. Therefore, the question remains open 
whether payments by a qualified collateral source would be considered sufficient to 
satisfy a support order where the plaintiff sought enforcement by means other than 
contempt. See remedies collected in j. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 2A MASS. PRAC. § 2703, at 
659 et seq. (1967). 
10 See generally j. LOMBARD, FAMILY LAW, 2A Mass. Prac. § 2703, at 659 et seq. (1967). 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2002, 330 N.E.2d at 474. 
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of child support orders apply with equal validity to orders for spousal 
support. If these policies are outweighed with respect to child support 
in cases where support is furnished from collateral sources, they 
should also be outweighed in cases involving support for spouses. On 
the other hand, the protection from contempt provided by Murphy ex-
tends only to benefits that are actually received from the collateral 
source by the obligee of the support order. 12 It does not cover cases 
where the benefit is one to which the intended recipient is entitled but 
which is not actually received. 
The major question left unresolved by the Murphy case is the scope 
of sources that will be entitled to credit under its holding. Although 
the Court held that the dependency benefits paid by the Veterans' 
Administration and the Social Security Administration are entitled to 
credit,13 it expressly refused to reach the question whether welfare 
benefits would similarly be credited. 14 Since the Court strictly limited 
its holding to the facts before it, the case should not be viewed as rec-
ognizing a broad range of collateral source payments that may be 
credited automatically against a support order. 
The Court authorized credit for payment by the Veterans' and So-
cial Security Administrations on the grounds that these payments 
were earned in part by the husband, and hence were not altogether a 
gift from the government. 15 It is difficult to ascertain at this point if 
other payments by collateral sources may be recognized for credit in 
the future, and if so, whether credit will be limited to payments from 
government agencies. 
Until a more precise definition of the scope of the Murphy holding 
is forthcoming from the Supreme Judicial Court, practitioners should 
advise clients not to rely on collateral source payments to satisfy their 
support obligations. In the absence of an express provision in the de-
cree concerning the effect of such benefits, the proper remedy is to 
file a petition for modification 16 of the support order, seeking a de-
termination that credit for sums paid by the collateral source be ex-
12 The opinion states that the probate court judge was concerned with credit for 
payments "either made directly to the wife or children or made to the husband and paid 
over by him." /d. at 2006, 330 N.E.2d at 475 (emphasis added). 
13 /d. at 2002, 330 N.E.2d at 474. 
14 /d. at 2008, 330 N.E.2d at 475. 
15 /d. at 2008, 330 N.E.2d at 475. It is difficult to fathom what policy is served by re-
quiring that the payments be "earned" before they are credited since the Court only au-
thorized credit where the payments are received by the obligee of the support order. If 
the donor of the benefit actually pays the support order to the obligee, it would appear 
to be of no consequence that the donor must pay that amount because of an obligation 
that the donor owes the obligor of the support order, or because he gratuitously fur-
nishes the support. One possible explanation in the Murphy case is that the obligation of 
support derives from a father's duty to support his children-and that duty is not dis-
charged where the payments depend on the goodwill of another. 
16 See G.L. c 208, § 28. 
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tended to the obligor spouse. Until a modification s obtained, the 
party should continue to pay the obligation himself. f the court de-
cides that these sums should be credited, the obligor spouse may ask 
the court to order the modification to apply retroa tivelyY In this 
fashion, the party would avoid contempt, since he is ,beying the de-
cree, and yet will preserve his rights. 
§6.5. Divorce: Contempt: Nature and Specifici of Charge. 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Cour , in Meranto v. 
Meranto, 1 followed its recent holding in Sodones v. Sod nes2 that if the 
defendant in a contempt proceeding does not receive dequate notice 
that the contempt charged is criminal, the case will treated as in-
volving civil contempt alone.3 , 
In Meranto, the libellant filed a libel for divorce against her hus-
band. On October 1, 1971, a decree nisi was enter; in which the 
probate court ordered the husband to pay child supp rt, and to per-
mit the wife and children to occupy the marital ho e. One month 
later, the decree was vacated by the consent of botht. arties and the 
libel was dismissed without prejudice. In January, 1 72, the decree 
nisi, including its provisions regarding child support nd occupation 
of the marital home, was reinstated.4 Approximately I one year later, 
the wife filed a petition for contempt, alleging that t~ husband had 
not complied with the reinstated decree. In March, 19 3, the husband 
was found guilty of contempt for failure to comply ith the decree 
nisi. He was sentenced to jail for either a period of six months or 
until he complied with the decree.5 · 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that be ause it was un-
clear from the contempt petition whether the contempt charged was 
civil or criminal, the defendant had not received adeq ate notice that 
criminal rather than civil contempt was involved. Ther fore, the Court 
concluded that, under Sodones, the case was required o be treated as 
one involving civil contempt alone. 6 I 
17 A probate court has inherent power to modify its awards retroa~tively. Cf Watts v. 
Watts, 314 Mass. 129, 49 N.E.2d 609 (1943). 
§6.5. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 227, 323 N.E.2d 723. 
2 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1303, 314 N.E.2d 906. 
3 /d. at 1311, 314 N.E.2d at 912. ! 
4 ld. at 228-29, 323 N.E.2d at 724. The Court noted that "the de~ree of January 10, 
1972 was irregular on its face in that it purported to reinstate the terms of a decree 
which previously had been dismissed without prejudice." 1975 Mas . Adv. Sh. at 232, 
323 N.E.2d at 725. The Court found it unnecessary to pass on the validity of this de-
cree since the finding of contempt was reversed. I d. ! 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 229, 323 N.E.2d at 724. 
6 ld. at 232, 323 N.E.2d at 725. The Court noted that if it had tre ted the case as one 
involving criminal contempt, it would have held that there had ot been effective 
waiver of counsel by the defendant. Furthermore, noting that the wife's counsel had 
called the husband to the witness stand, the Court stated that it wo ld be "highly im-
proper" to call the defendant as a witness against himself in a cr minal proceeding. 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 233, 323 N.E.2d at 725. 
8
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The Court found that not only was the defendant not adequately 
notified as to the nature of the contempt proceeding against him, but 
he also had not been given notice of the specific acts of contempt 
charged. 7 The Court held that irrespective of whether the contempt 
was civil or criminal in nature, notice of the specific acts relied on 
must be given to the defendant prior to a hearing on the contempt 
petition.8 
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court held that with re-
spect to the charge of noncompliance with the order to permit the 
wife and children to occupy the marital home, the mere allegation in 
the contempt petition that the husband "refused [to allow] her to oc-
cupy the Grafton Premises" was inadequate in that it failed to set 
forth when, where, and in what manner he had violated the provi-
sions of the decree. 9 The Court therefore struck out so much of the 
contempt charges as were based on the husband's refusal to permit 
the wife and children to occupy the marital home. 10 
The Court concluded that the allegation of late child support pay-
ments was set out with sufficient particularity, but nevertheless re-
versed the finding of contempt with respect to this issue, because the 
husband's payments were substantially up to date. 11 
Thus, Meranto establishes three requirements for pleadings in con-
tempt actions: (1) unless it is clear from the contempt petition that the 
contempt charged is criminal, it will be treated only as civil 
7 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 233, 323 N.E.2d at 725. 
8 /d. In so holding, the Court relied on Sodones. !d. In Sodones, the defendant ap-
pealed from a probate court decree that adjudged him guilty of contempt for failure to 
comply with a prior court order for separate support. The Supreme Judicial Court 
cited Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536-37 (1925), for the undisputed proposi-
tion that "[d]ue process requires that a ... [defendant] must be given notice of the 
charges against him prior to a hearing on criminal or civil contempt whenever the al-
legedly contemptuous conduct occurred outside the presence of the Court." 1974 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1309, 314 N.E.2d at 911. 
9 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 233, 323 N.E.2d at 725. The requirements of specificity as 
enunciated by the Court apply to both criminal and civil contempt, and are analogous 
to the defendant's right to information sought by way of a bill of particulars in a crimi-
nal proceeding. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chapin, 333 Mass. 610, 617-18, 132 N.E.2d 
404, 409 ( 1956) (defendant, as of right, is entitled to know in response to a bill of par-
ticulars the time, the place, the manner, and the means of the commission of the of-
fense). Meranto puts on the party alleging contemptuous conduct the burden to set 
forth with specificity the charges, rather than requiring the defendant to ascertain 
through discovery the details of the alleged contemptuous conduct. In this respect, 
Meranto departs from Sodones, where the Court held that if the charge contained no 
specific allegations, the burden was on the defendant to "[move] for a continuance of 
the hearing or for specification of the charges." 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1310, 314 
N.E.2d at 911-12. 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 233-34, 323 N.E.2d at 725. 
11 !d. at 334, 323 N.E.2d at 725. 
9
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contempt; 12 (2) regardless of whether civil or crimin~l contempt is in-
volved, it is incumbent on the moving party to spedify where, when, 
and in what manner the decree was violated; and (3) failure to ade-
quately specify the charge will result in dismissal. These requirements 
are clear and if adhered to by practitioners will a~oid unnecessary 
confusion in the future. ' 
§6.6. Divorce: Financial Obligations Discharged by Bankruptcy. 
In Abrams v. Burg, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court co9fronted the issue 
whether certain obligations incurred by a husband ~ursuant to a sep-
aration agreement were incurred for the support and maintenance of 
the wife, or were incurred with respect to a marital property settle-
ment. At stake was whether these obligations had befn discharged by 
the husband's subsequent bankruptcy, since under, the Bankruptcy 
Act, 2 obligations with respect to a property settlement are discharge-
able, while those for spousal support are not. 3 , 
On December 30, 1960, Harold and Edith Burg et\ttered into a sep-
aration agreement in contemplation of divorce. A detree absolute was 
entered in 1961. Thereupon, the separation agreement became effec-
tive by its terms.4 The agreement provided, inter alia, that the hus-
band was to pay the wife: (1) a lump sum of $125,000 immediately, 
(2) an additional sum of $88,000 in nine installments, and (3) a third 
sum of $40,000 in 1967. He was given the option of satisfying the 
$88,000 and $40,000 obligations by making a sing~e $100,000 pay-
ment prior to 1963.5 To insure that the payments tp the wife would 
be tax-free to her, the husband agreed to claim no tax deduction with 
respect to any of these payments.6 
i 
12 The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is important and must be 
maintained if the substantive rights of the contemnor in the proceeding are to be pro-
tected. Those rights in a criminal proceeding are of constitutiont dimensions. As has 
been previously noted, the judge in a criminal contempt proceedi g has the obligation 
to inform the defendant of his right to effective assistance of cou sel and that right, if 
waived, must be done knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. See note 6 supra. 
Additionally, an alleged criminal contemnor is entitled: (l) to the presumption of inno-
cence, Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 4!44 (1911); (2) to be 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, id.; (3) to refuse to inc!riminate himself, id.; 
(4) to a public trial before an unbiasedjudge,/n re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269-73 (1948); 
(5) to apply for an execution pardon, Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1924); (6) to the 
applicability of the statute of limitations, Gompers v. United $tates, 233 U.S. 604 
(1913); and (7) "to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant eithe~ to the issue of com-
plete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigatio~ of the penalty to be 
imposed." Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925). 
§6.6. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1353, 327 N.E.2d 745. 
2 11 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1970). 
3 /d. § 35(a)(7). 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1353, 327 N.E.2d at 746. 
5 /d. at 1357, 327 N.E.2d at 747. 
6 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 71, 215. 
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Pursuant to the agreement, the husband paid the $125,000 and 
$40,000 obligations and all installments of the $88,000 obligation with 
the exception of $32,000, representing the final two installments. 7 On 
January 30, 1969, before these final two payments were due, the de-
fendant filed a petition for discharge in bankruptcy, which was 
granted on December 1, 1970.8 Thereafter plaintiff Abrams, as trus-
tee for the wife, brought suit in the probate court against the husband 
for the payment of the remaining $32,000. The probate court ruled 
that the unpaid amounts owed to the wife were for her maintenance 
and support, and hence were not discharged by the husband's 
bankruptcy.9 On direct appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court 
reversed and ordered that plaintiffs suit on the separation agreement 
be dismissed.10 
Section 17a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act provides that "[a] discharge in 
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts ... 
except such as ... are for alimony due or to become due or for 
maintenance or support of wife .... "11 Thus, whereas obligations for 
maintenance and support are excepted from discharge by the forego-
ing provision, obligations incurred through a property settlement are 
not. 12 The Court stated that the issue whether the separation agree-
ment is to be characterized as a property settlement or embodies as 
well a legal obligation to support the other spouse turns on the intent 
of the parties as gleaned from the face of that agreement. 13 The 
Court then referred to several factors that are generally indicative of 
the parties' intent to provide for support and maintenance rather 
than for a property settlement. These factors are: (1) a provision that 
the obligation terminates on the death of either spouse or on the re-
marriage of the recipient spouse; (2) a schedule of payments payable 
in installments over a substantial period; (3) a provision that all pay-
ments are to be taxable to the recipient; and (4) a description of the 
obligations of the parties in terms of support to the wife. 14 
The Court held that on the basis of these factors the unsatisfied ob-
ligations of the husband were not obligations for the maintenance and 
support of the wife and were therefore discharged in bankruptcy .15 
The Court found the following aspects of the separation agreement 
determinative: (1) the agreement was expressed not in terms of sup-
7 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1357 n.3, 327 N.E.2d at 747 n.3. 
8 /d. at 1354, 327 N.E.2d at 746. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. at 1358-59, 327 N.E.2d at 748. 
11 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970). 
12 E.g., Yarus v. Yarus, 178 Cal. App.2d 190,3 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1960); lA CoLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY§ 17.19 (14th ed. 1975). 
13 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1357, 327 N.E.2d at 747. 
14 Id. at 1355-56, 1358-59, 327 N.E.2d at 747, 748. 
15 /d. at 1358-59, 327 N.E.2d at 748. 
11
Inker: Chapter 6: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
I 
98 1975 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS L..\W §6.7 
! 
port for the wife, but solely in terms of the distributi~n. of property; 
(2) the obligations to pay $125,000 immediately and $140,000 in 1967 
were absolute, unaffected by the death of either party or by the re-
marriage of the wife; (3) the obligation to pay $88,000 in nine annual 
installments, although characteristic of a support paym~nt, could have 
been discharged by the payment of a discounted sum by the end of 
1962 and thus appeared to represent merely a defrrred payment 
plan; and (4) all payments were to be tax-free to the wife and non-
deductible by the husband. 16 Although noting that a qischarge of the 
husband's obligation to support his wife may have been involved in 
the negotiation of the agreement, the Court felt constrained to con-
sider only the clear language of the agreement in detetmining the in-
tent of the parties. 17 , 
The Abrams case illustrates the need for lawyers t~ carefully take 
into account both tax and bankruptcy considerations before drafting a 
separation agreement. Although it is generally to the ldonor spouse's 
advantage to characterize obligations under the separation agreement 
as being for the wife's maintenance and support in orc\er that he may 
benefit from the deduction provision of section 215 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the donor should bear in mind that su¢h a characteri-
zation will preclude that obligation's discharge in a subsequent bank-
ruptcy of the donor. Conversely, although a recipient spouse may 
prefer to denominate payments receivable under a separation agree-
ment as a property settlement in order to avoid the inclusion of such 
payments in her taxable income under section 71 of th~ Internal Rev-
enue Code, she should remember that payments due in fulfillment 
of a property settlement agreement would be discharg~d if the donor 
spouse were to receive a discharge of obligations under a bankruptcy 
decree. 
§6.7. Divorce: Presumption of Gift to Joint Fundi Rebutted. In 
Magro v. Magro, 1 the Appeals Court held that certain checks and 
monies deposited by a wife in two joint bank accounts standing in the 
names of her and her husband were not intended as gifts for the ben-
efit of both spouses.2 The husband had petitioned th~ probate court 
to determine title to certain disputed items, relying on the presump-
tion that a wife's contribution to a fund held jointly b~ the spouses is 
intended as a gift for the benefit of both spouses.3 The probate court 
found no donative intent on the part of the wife and .therefore con-
16 /d. 
17 /d. 
§ 6.7. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 640, 326 N.E.2d 735. 
2 /d. at 640-41, 326 N.E.2d at 736. 
3 See, e.g., Ross v. Ross, 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 817, 822-23, 825, 314 N.E.2d 
888, 893-94, 895, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 947 (1975). I 
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eluded that the presumption of a gift was rebutted.4 The Appeals 
Court affirmed. 5 
The probate court concluded that the presumption of a gift was re-
butted because the husband had "dominated" his wife and subjected 
her to "frequent beatings and other forms of harassment."6 This 
domination, coupled with the additional finding by the probate court 
that the husband had refused to work during most of the marriage 
and had forced his wife to give him spending money from her 
biweekly paychecks, led the trial judge to conclude that the wife "was 
by no means a free agent and that her contributions to the joint funds 
in question resulted more from [the husband's] coercive tactics than 
from [the wife's] voluntary choice." 7 The Appeals Court held that 
these facts were sufficient to support a finding by the probate judge 
that the presumption of a gift had been rebutted. 8 
§6.8. Divorce: Appeal From Decree Nisi. Two cases decided 
during the Survey year, Scholz v. Scholz 1 and Dennis v. Dennis, 2 in-
volved appeals from a decree nisi. 
Scholz involved a familiar procedural pitfall experienced by many 
domestic relations practitioners. On July 10, 1972, a decree nisi was 
entered on Mrs. Scholz's libel from which her husband seasonably ap-
pealed. The husband's attorney, however, neglected to: (1) file a 
statement of objections to the decree becoming absolute; 3 (2) obtain 
an order from a judge of the probate court staying the decree from 
becoming absolute; or (3) obtain an order from a justice of the Su-
4 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 640-41, 326 N.E.2d at 736. The trial judge also 
found that two tax refund checks, payable to the wife and representing overpayments 
of taxes on income earned exclusively by the wife, were deposited by the wife in the 
joint account of the parties without the intention of making a gift. The Appeals Court 
held that, on those facts, there was no basis for applying the presumption of a gift. !d. 
at 640, 326 N.E.2d at 736. 
5 /d. at 640-41, 326 N .E.2d at 736. 
6 /d. 
1 /d. at 641, 326 N.E.2d at 736. 
8 /d. 
§ 6.8. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 649, 324 N.E.2d 617. 
2 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 890, 330 N.E.2d 490. 
3 This matter, previously governed by Probate Court Rule 45, is now controlled by 
MAss. R. DoM. REL. P. 58(c), which is substantially the same: 
At any time before the expiration of six months from the entry of a judgment of 
divorce nisi, the defendant, or any other person interested, may file in the Registry 
of Probate a statement of objections to the judgment becoming absolute, which 
shall set forth specifically the facts on which it is founded and shall be verified by 
affidavit. Notice of the filing of said objections shall be given to the plaintiff or de-
fendant or his attorney, not later than the day of filing said objections. The judg-
ment shall not become absolute until such objections have been disposed of by the 
court. If said petition to stay the judgment absolute is subsequently dismissed by 
the court, the judgment shall become absolute as of six months from the date of 
the judgment nisi. 
13
Inker: Chapter 6: Domestic Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
100 1975 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS 1-AW §6.8 
i 
preme Judicial Court staying the decree from becom~ng absolute.4 In 
affirming a dismissal by the Appeals Court5 of the husband's appeal 
from the entry of the decree nisi, the Supreme Judicial Court relied 
on two established principles. First, "the pendency of an appeal does 
not prevent the decree from becoming absolute."6 !As a result, on 
January 10, 1973, six months following its entry, th¢ decree nisi be-
came absolute. 7 Second, "[o]nce the decree becomes absolute, the ap-
peal from the decree nisi brings no issue before the court and must 
be dismissed."8 
The husband relied on Eldridge v. Eldridge9 for the ,proposition that 
where a decree nisi was obtained by fraud or mista~e, that fact ipso 
facto stayed the decree from becoming absolute. 10 The Court, how-
ever, expressly disapproved so much of Eldridge as suggested that 
fraud or mistake automatically stayed the decree nisi from becoming 
final. 11 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that Eldridge w~s based on the 
power of the probate court to correct its final decree$ after they have 
been entered to the extent that they were occasioqed by fraud or 
mistake. 12 Thus, when a decree nisi is fraudulently or mistakenly in-
4 See G.L. c. 215, §§ 23-24. 
5 1974 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 739, 314 N.E.2d 139. • 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 651, 324 N.E.2d at 618, citing MacNev~n v. MacNevin, 319 
Mass. 719, 722,67 N.E.2d 477,478 (1946). 
7 See G.L. c. 208, § 21. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 651, 324 N.E.2d at 618, citing Sloane v. Sloane, 349 Mass. 
318,319,208 N.E.2d 211,212 (1965). 
9 278 Mass. 309, 180 N.E. 137 (1932). 
10 1975 Mass Adv. Sh. at 649-50, 324 N.E.2d at 618. Part of ~he language of the 
Eldridge case appeared to support the proposition that a decree n'si was automatically 
stayed from becoming absolute by the fact that it was obtained by fraud or mistake: 
The mistake in the case at bar could have been found in believing that the plea of 
condonation filed originally by the attorney of the libellee was broad enough to be 
applicable to all causes for divorce alleged in the libel. Condonaf,ion is an affirma-
tive defense. It could not be heard unless set up by the answer. !Divorce Rule 8 of 
the Probate Court .... It is plain that the Probate Court on jqne 27, 1930, had 
jurisdiction to vacate the decree nisi entered on September 16, 1 ~29, as the libellee 
on June 26, 1930, had waived his appeal to this court. The entry of the decree nisi 
was in its nature interlocutory; the libel was still pending and could be corrected or 
revoked for mistake or for any reason adequate in law. It follows that upon the 
facts disclosed by the record it did not become absolute at the expi'l(ation of six months 
from the date it was entered. · 
278 Mass. at 312, 180 N.E. at 139 (emphasis added). 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 652, 324 N.E.2d at 618. 
12 /d. at 651-52, 324 N.E.2d at 618. The court in Eldridge stated: 
It is settled that a court of probate has power to correct or vacate its decree for 
adequate and legal cause. It was said in the recent case of Goss v. Donnell, 263 
Mass. 521, at pages 523-24, 161 N.E. 896, 897: "It now is settlf. that a court of 
probate has power to correct errors in its decrees arising out of raud, or mistake, 
or want of jurisdiction, or for any reason adequate in law. Its po er in this field is 
'analogous to that of courts of common law to issue writs of re iew and of courts 
14
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duced, it is subject to vacation by the probate court even after it has 
become absolute.13 However, fraud or mistake does not stay the de-
cree nisi from becoming absolute. 14 Since the parties in Scholz had not 
followed any authorized method of staying the decree nisi, 15 it became 
absolute six months after its entry, 16 thereby mooting any appeal from 
the decree nisi. 17 
Under the recently adopted Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Rela-
tions Procedure, 18 an appellant is protected against having his appeal 
mooted by the running of the nisi period. Rule 62(g) provides: 
The filing of an appeal shall stay the running of the nisi period as 
provided by Rule 58(c). If the appeal is subsequently dismissed by 
the appellate court, the judgment shall become absolute as of six 
months from the date of the judgment nisi. The filing of an ap-
peal shall not stay the operation of any other order or judgment 
of the court relative to custody, visitation, alimony, support or 
maintenance unless the court otherwise orders.19 
This rule is an improvement over the prior domestic relations practice 
in that it streamlines the process of taking an appeal from a decree 
nisi, eliminating the largely ceremonial process of either filing objec-
tions to the decree becoming final, seeking a special order from the 
court to stay the decree from becoming absolute, or both. The rule 
also furthers the normal expectations of the party who appeals the 
judgment nisi. It should be noted that Rule 62(g) only prevents the 
judgment nisi from becoming absolute and thus saves the appeal from 
that decree from becoming moot. The substantive provisions of the 
judgment relative to custody and alimony, and other orders incidental 
of equity to entertain bills of review. It is to correct mistakes of fact or of law.' " 
Crocker v. Crocker, 198 Mass. 401, 404-05, 84 N.E. 476. 
278 Mass. at 314, 180 N.E. at 139. 
13 With respect to the effect of G.L. c. 208, § 21, making decrees nisi absolute after 
the expiration of a six month period (absent the filing of objections or obtaining a stay 
order), the Eldridge Court said: 
It is the contention of the libellant that as the libellee failed to file any objections 
under the rule the decree nisi became absolute under G.L. c. 208, § 21. It is suffi-
cient to say that the rule is not applicable to the facts in the case at bar. Indepen-
dently of the rule a decree for divorce may be revoked or denied if against public 
policy or for any reason adequate in law. 
278 Mass. at 314, 180 N.E. at 139. The proper vehicle for invoking the probate court's 
power to modify decrees, whether nisi or absolute, is by motion under MAss. R. DoM. 
REL. P. 60(b). 
14 See text at note 11 supra. 
15 See text at notes 3-4 supra. 
18 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 651, 324 N.E.2d at 618. See G.L. c. 208, § 21. 
17 /d. See Sloane v. Sloane, 349 Mass. 318, 319, 208 N.E.2d 211, 212 (1965) (once the 
decree nisi becomes absolute, an appeal from the decree brings no issue to the court). 
18 The Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure became effective on July 1, 1975, by 
vote of the Judges of the probate court, and approval of the Supreme Judicial Court. 
19 MASS. R. DoM. REL. P. 62(g) (emphasis added). 
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to the decree are not held in abeyance by the filing f.f an appeal. 20 
Furthermore, if the appeal is subsequently dismissed, t e decree abso-
lute will be considered to have taken effect as of six m nths from the 
date of the judgment nisi. 21 Thus, the Rule automa ically stays the 
judgment nisi from becoming absolute upon the filin of an appeal, 
thereby avoiding the procedural trap of having the a~peal dismissed 
because the party did not take any of the three steps \to stay the de-
cree nisi from becoming absolute. i 
In Dennis v. Dennis, 22 a decree nisi was entered on t. pril 17, 1974. 
The parties did not file their respective claims of appe I from the de-
cree until the twenty-day statutory period for filing ha expired.23 On 
September 5, 1974, the probate court judge vacated ,the April 17th 
decree,24 stating that it had been entered prematurely\ due to clerical 
error, and he thereupon issued a new decree, identica) in all respects 
to the April 17th decree, except that it was datedi, September 5, 
1974.25 The parties' appeals were timely with respect qnly to the Sep-
tember 5th decree.26 . 
The Appeals Court dismissed the appeals on the ground that the 
parties had not filed their claims of appeal within the tequired period 
following the April 17th decree.27 In reaching this de~ision, the Ap-
peals Court found that there were no facts to supportfe trial court's 
conclusion that the April decree had been entered pre aturely due to 
clerical error. Moreover, since the decree ordered ali ony and sup-
port payments to begin on April 20, 1974, it could no have been in-
tended for entry on September 5, 1974.28 The App~ls Court con-
cluded that the decree as entered on April 17th was sti I in force since 
(1) it did represent the court's actual decision and ( ) the probate 
judge therefore had no authority to vacate it since v~cation is only 
proper to correct a decree that does not conform to th~ court's actual 
decision.29 Consequently, since the claims of appeal w¢re not season-
ably filed, the appeal was dismissed. 30 , 
The Dennis case, like the Scholz case, illustrates the i importance of 
following proper procedure to preserve a party's right~ on appeal. In 
Dennis, the parties tried to circumvent the requiremeqts of section 9 
of chapter 215 of the General Laws, which requires 1the filing of a 
20 /d. 
21Jd. 
22 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 890, 330 N.E.2d 490. . 
23 Id. at 890-91, 330 N.E.2d at 491. See G.L. c. 215, § 9, as amended through Acts of 
1947, c. 360. I 
24 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 890, 330 N.E.2d at 491. 1 
2. /d. 
26 Id. at 890-91, 330 N.E.2d at 491. \ 
27 /d. at 892-94, 330 N.E.2d at 492-93. 1 
28 Id. at 891-92, 330 N.E.2d at 492. J _ 
29 /d. at 891, ;!30 N.E.2d at 492, citing Chagnon v. Chagnon, 300 Mass. 309, 311-12, 
15 N.E.2d 231, 232 (1938). I 
30 Id. at 892, 330 N.E.2d at 492-93. . 
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claim of appeal within 20 days following the entry of judgment, by 
prevailing upon the probate court to vacate the initial decree entered 
on April 17, 1974 and to enter judgment on a new decree, with iden-
tical substantive provisions, on September 5, 1974. The Appeals Court 
refused to countenance such a vacation by the probate court, which, 
in effect, would have had the result of lengthening the time period 
within which a claim of appeal could be filed. 31 Instead, the Appeals 
Court insisted that the parties resort to the proper procedural 
remedy-that of seeking leave to file their claim of appeal late by mo-
tion before the judge of the probate court.32 
The adoption in Massachusetts of the Massachusetts Rules of Appel-
late Procedure and the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations 
Procedure does not alter the result reached in the Dennis case. Under 
Rule 60(a) of the Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure, the probate 
court is empowered to correct clerical errors in its decrees in order 
that the record may reflect the judgment actually made by the court. 33 
Nonetheless, this Rule cannot be used as a vehicle for altering decrees 
that events later show to have been improvidently issued. The proper 
remedy to vacate such decrees is by way of motion under Rule 
60(b).34 Moreover, Rule 60(a) cannot be used as a vehicle to circum-
31 See id. at 891 nn.1 & 2, 330 N.E.2d at 491-92 nn.1 & 2. 
32 See id. at 894, 330 N.E.2d at 493. See also G.L. c. 215, § 15, which provides: 
A party who has, by mistake or accident or other sufficient cause, omitted to claim 
an appeal from a final decree within the time prescribed therefore may, within 
one year after the entry of the decree from which he desires to appeal, petition 
the supreme judicial court for leave to appeal, which may be granted upon terms 
by any of the justices of that court. Such petition shall be filed with the clerk of the 
supreme judicial court for Suffolk county. 
33 MASS. R. DOM. REL. P. 60(a) provides: 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be 
so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter 
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
34 MASS. R. DoM. REL. P. 60(b) provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (l) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or other-
wise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for. reasons (1), 
(2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was 
entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs 
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vent the effect of Rules 3 and 4 of the Massachusetts Rfules of Appel-
late Procedure, which require a claim of appeal to ~e filed within 
thirty days following the entry of judgment.35 l 
§6.9. Separate Support: Factors To Be Considere<J. In LaVallee 
v. LaVallee/ the Appeals Court affirmed a dismissal o~ a wife's sepa-
rate support petition. The husband had deposited his! life savings in 
joint bank accounts standing in the names of both th~ husband and 
the wife. The wife then withdrew all of the funds without her 
husband's knowledge and deposited them in an acco~'nt standing in 
her name alone. 2 The court held that the probate udge was not 
plainly wrong in dismissing the wife's petition in light f her "acquisi-
tive conduct considered in conjunction with the relative1 resources and 
necessities of the parties, as well as their condition in hfe .... "3 It is 
not clear, however, whether the court concluded that these facts gave 
the husband 'justifiable cause" to withhold support or whether, under 
the circumstances, "suitable support" had been provide~.4 
In reaching its result, the Appeals Court reiterated the applicable 
principles governing the issuance of an order for separ te support: 
' On a petition for separate support, as in the case of a l~bel of divorce, 
the questions whether support should be awarded ~nd if so its 
amount rest in the sound discretion of the judge afttr considera-
tion of the facts. . . . The circumstances to be considlered include 
"the necessities of the wife and the pecuniary reso~rces of the 
husband, the condition in life of the parties and their I mode of liv-
ing and the conduct of the parties."5 : 
I 
The LaVallee case thus raises the question whether tlie factors to be 
considered in determining the amount of separate sup~ort have been 
expanded by the 1974 amendment to section 34 of cha ter 208 of the 
General Laws, the alimony provision.6 As the Appeals · ourt correctly 
I 
of review, of error, of audita querela, and petitions to vacatt1 judgment are 
abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
35 MASS. R. APP. P. 4 provides: "Unless otherwise provided by sta~ute, the notice of 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the lower (:ourt within thirty 
days of the date of the entry of the judgment appealed from .... " ' 
§ 6.9. 1 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 611, 326 N.E.2d 720. 
2 !d. at 611, 326 N.E.2d at 721. 
3 !d. 
4 See id. G.L. c. 209, § 32 provides: "If a husband fails without jlflstifiable cause, to 
provide suitable support for his wife, ... the probate court may .. i. make ... orders 
relative to the support of the wife .... " i 
5 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 611-12, 326 N.E.2d at 721-22l(emphasis added), 
citing Verdone v. Verdone, 346 Mass. 263, 191 N.E.2d 299 (1963);~Wilson v. Wilson, 
329 Mass. 208, 107 N.E.2d 195 (1952); Coe v. Coe, 313 Mass. 23 , 46 N.E.2d 1017 
(1943); Topor v. Topor, 287 Mass. 473, 192 N.E. 52 (1934); Bro n v. Brown, 222 
Mass. 415, Ill N.E. 42 (1916). , 
6 Acts of 1974, c. 565. I 
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observed in LaVallee, the factors governing separate support orders in 
the past have been the same as those governing awards of alimony in 
divorce 'cases. 7 The question therefore arises whether the numerous 
factors set forth in section 34.;_factors that must considered by a 
court in awarding alimony8-must also be considered by a court in 
passing upon a separate ·support petition. There is no bar to such 
consideration. Indeed, the long-standing recognition of the similarity 
in function of separate support and alimony suggests such an applica-
tion of section 34. Furthermore, since identical factors have been con-
sidered in the past; it seems logical to continue that tradition and to 
incorporate into the law of separate support the Legislature's. most re-
cent pronouncement of factors relevant in determining alimony .. 
Of course, even if separate support petitions are to be considered 
henceforth in light of the additional factors inserted in the alimony 
provision by the Legislature, the probate court is still without power 
to divide property on a separate support petition. Section 32 of chap-
ter 209 of the . General Laws permits a party to file a complaint for 
separate support and allows the court to "make further orders relative 
to the support of the wife."9 Thus, the power of the probate court on a 
separate support petition is l~mited to providing for the support of 
the wife. Such support does not encompass a divjsion of the marital 
assets. Such a division should only follow a termination of the marital 
relationship and therefore should not be required in an ~rder of 
separate support since the. marital relationship is still in force. 10 
B. LEGISLATION 
· §6.10. Divorce: juri~diction. Chapter 400 of the Acts of 1975 
chapged thejurisdictional requirements of section 5 of chapter 208 of 
the General Laws for obtaining a divorce in Massachusetts. Where the 
cause of action arose outside of the Commonwealth, jurisdicti,on now 
exits to grant a divorce where the plaintiff has lived in the Common-
wealth for a perioq ,of one year prior to the commencement of the. 
action. 1 Formerly, a two-year period was required. 2 Where the cause 
of action arose within the Commonwealth, the jurisdictional require-
7 See tex;t at note 5 supra. 
8 Those. factors are: 
the length of the marriage, the' conduct of the parties during the 'marriage, the 
age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, 
employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties and the opportun-
ity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. 
G.L. c. 208, § 34. 
9 G.L. c. 209, § 32 (emphasis added). 
1° Cf. G.L. c. 208, § 34, which provides in part: "In addition to or in lieu of an order 
to pay alimony, the court may assign to either the husband or wife all or any part of 
the estate of the other." · 
§ 6.10. 1 Acts of 1975, c. 400, § '10. 
2 G.L. c. 208, § 5, as amended through Acts of 1969, c. 162. 
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ments have been modified to require that the plaintiff be a 
"domiciliary" of the Commonwealth at the time the action is 
commenced.3 Prior to this enactment, section 5 required that the 
plaintiff be a "resident" of the Commonwealth at the time of the 
commencement of the action.4 Thus, where the issuq of jurisdicti9n 
arises in a case where the cause of action arose witMn the state, the 
plaintiff will now have to establish not only physical bresence within 
the Commonwealth but also an intent to maintai~ a permanent 
home.5 i 
§6.11. Divorce: Orders to Vacate the Marital HoaU,. Chapter 321 
of the Acts of 1975, as amended by chapter 400 of the Acts of 1975, 
modified section 34B of chapter 208 of the General Laws, which re-
lates to orders by the court to vacate the marital home. Section 34B 
now provides in part: 
Any court having jurisdiction of actions for divorce, or for nul-
lity of marriage or of separate support or mainfenance, may, 
upon commencement of such action and during the pendency 
thereof, order the husband or wife to vacate forthw~th the marital 
home for a period of time not exceeding ninety d*ys, and upon 
further motion for such additional certain period df time, as the 
court deems necessary or appropriate if the court 1 finds, after a 
hearing, that the health, safety or welfare of the moving party or 
any minor children residing with the parties would be endangered 
or substantially impaired by a failure to enter such an order. 1 
This modification enlarges, from sixty to ninety days, the initial time 
period for which a spouse can be ordered to vacf!te the marital 
home. 2 The provision also allows the court, upon a ~ubsequent mo-
tion, to extend the order for such a period as ttie court deems 
necessary.3 In the prior enactment, there was no sU<Jh provision for 
extending the initial sixty-day period. 4 1 
Chapter 400 also added a new provision to section! 34B, following 
the provision quoted supra, which authorizes temporary orders to va-
cate made without notice: 
If the moving party demonstrates a substantial likelihood of im-
mediate danger to his or her health, safety or welfare or to that of 
such minor children from the opposing party, the court may 
enter a temporary order without notice, and shall immediately 
3 Acts of 1975, c. 400, § 10. 
4 G.L. c. 208, § 5, as amended through Acts of 1969, c. 162. 
• See Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass. 158, 160 (1867). 
§ 6.11. 1 Acts of 1975, c. 400, § 35. 
2 See Acts of 1970, c. 4 72, as amended, G.L. c. 208, § 34B. 
3 Acts of 1975, c. 400, § 35. 
4 Acts of 1970, c. 472, as amended, G.L. c. 208, § 34B. 
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thereafter notify said opposing party and give him or her an op-
portunity to be heard as soon as possible but not later than five 
days after such order is entered on the question of continuing 
such temporary order. The court may issue an order to vacate al-
though the opposing party does not reside in the marital home at 
the time of its issuance, or if the moving party has left such home 
and has not returned there because of fear for his or her safety 
or for that of any minor children.5 
The prior statute required that the spouse be given at least three-
days' notice of the hearing. 6 
5 Acts of 1975, c. 400, § 35. 
8 Acts of 1970, c. 472, as amended, G.L. c. 208, § 34B. 
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